In this paper stochastic dynamic programming is used to investigate land conversion decisions taken by a multitude of landholders under uncertainty about the value of environmental services and irreversible development. We study land conversion under competition on the market for agricultural products when voluntary and mandatory measures are combined by the Government to induce adequate participation in a conservation plan. We study the impact of uncertainty on the optimal conversion policy and discuss conversion dynamics under di¤erent policy scenarios on the basis of the relative long-run expected rate of deforestation. Interestingly, we show that uncertainty, even if it induces conversion postponement in the short-run, increases the average rate of deforestation and reduces expected time for total conversion in the long run. Finally, we illustrate our …ndings through some numerical simulations. keywords: optimal stopping, deforestation, payments for environmental services, natural resources management. jel classification: C61, D81, Q24, Q58.
Introduction
other papers dealing with new and challenging questions requiring more and more complex model set-up. 5 Two contributions close to ours are Bulte et al. (2002) and Leroux et al. (2009) . In the …rst paper, the authors determine the socially optimal forest stock to be held by trading o¤ pro…t from agriculture and the value of ES attached to forest conservation. Their analysis highlights the value of the option to postpone land clearing under irreversibility of environmental impact and uncertainty about conservation bene…ts. A similar problem is solved in Leroux et al. (2009) where, unlike the previous paper, the authors allow for ecological feedback and consider its impact both on the expected trend and volatility of the value of ES. Both papers, however, by solving the allocative problem from a central planner perspective, miss the complexity of challenges characterizing conservation policies and the role that competition on markets for agricultural products may have on conversion decisions.
In this paper, we aim to investigate these issues by modelling conversion decisions in a decentralized economy populated by a multitude of homogenous landholders where the Government has introduced a payment scheme for conservation. Each landholder manages a portion of total available land and may conserve or develop it by a¤ording a conversion cost. ES provided by natural habitats on conserved land have a value proportional to the preserved surface. Such value is stochastic and ‡uctuates following a geometric Brownian motion. When the parcel is developed then land enters as an input into the production of private goods and/or services (co¤ee, rubber, soy, palm oil, timber, biofuels, cattle, etc.) destined to a competitive market.
In this context, the Government introduces a land use policy which aims to balance conservation and development. The policy is based on a PES scheme implemented through a conservation contract. Such contract …xes limits to the plot development (i.e. it may be totally or partially developed) and establishes a compensation for land kept aside. In addition to the individual plot set-aside policy, we also consider the possibility that the Government impose a limit on the total clearable forested land in the targeted area.
In this frame, we determine analytically the optimal conversion path and study the impact that di¤erent payment schemes may have on the conversion dynamics. Not surprisingly, conversion is postponed if a higher compensation is paid to landholders conserving the entire plot. This is due to the higher opportunity cost of conversion which is higher since it includes the payments implicitly given up converting. Interestingly, we show that, as suggested by Ferraro (2001) , a landholder may conserve the entire plot even if only partially compensated for the provided ES. We note that only progressive reductions in the value of ES may induce land clearing. Studying the impact of a limit on the aggregate conversion, we identify two possible scenarios. In fact, depending on the total land surface privately worth to be developed, such limit may be binding or not. If not binding then landholders stop converting land at an aggregate surface smaller than the one targeted by the Government since pro…ts from further land conversion are too low. If binding, on the contrary, further conversion is pro…table and then landholders, fearing a restriction in the exercise of the option to convert, may start a conversion run 6 which rapidly exhausts the forest stock up to the …xed limit. 7 Comparing …rst-best and second-best conversion policy we identify the combination of policy parameters leading to a …rst-best conversion policy.
To assess the temporal performance of the optimal conservation policy and study the impact of increasing uncertainty about future environmental bene…ts on conversion speed, we derive the long-run average growth rate of deforestation. Interestingly, we show that higher uncertainty over payments, even if it induces conversion postponement in the short-run, increases the average rate of deforestation and reduces expected time for total conversion in the long run.
Finally, we run several numerical simulations based on the well known case of Costa Rica. Firstly, we study the impact of di¤erent conservation policies on the optimal forest stock and the expected long-run average rate of deforestation. Second, given a certain initial forest stock, we rank di¤erent policies on the basis of long-run average rate of deforestation and expected total conversion time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic set-up for the model is 5 Among them, see for instance Conrad (1980) , Clarke and Reed (1989) , Reed (1993) , Conrad (1997) , Conrad (2000) . 6 In Australia, the Productivity Commission reports evidence of pre-emptive clearing due to the introduction of clearing restrictions (Productivity Commission, 2004 ). On unintended impacts of public policy see for instance Stavins and Ja¤e (1990) showing that, despite an explicit federal conservation policy, 30% of forested wetland conversion in the Mississippi Valley has been induced by federal ‡ood-control projects. In this respect, see also Maestad (2001) showing how timber trade restrictions may induce an increase in logging. 7 A similar e¤ect has been …rstly noted by Bartolini (1993) . In this paper, the author studies decentralized investment decision in a market where a limit on aggregate investment is present.
presented. In Section 3 we study the equilibrium in the conversion strategies and compare …rst-best and second-best outcomes. In Section 4, we discuss issues related to the PES voluntary participation and contract enforceability. Section 5 is devoted to the derivation of the long-run average rate of conversion. In Section 6 we illustrate our main …ndings through numerical exercises. Section 7 concludes.
A Dynamic Model of Land Conversion
Consider a country where at time period t 0 the total land available, L, is allocated as follows:
where A(t) is the surface cultivated and F (t) is the portion still in its pristine natural state covered by a primary forest. Assume that F (t) is divided into in…nitesimally small and homogenous parcels of equal extent held by a multitude of identical risk-neutral landholders. 9 By normalizing such extent to 1 hectare, F (t) denotes also the number of agents in the economy. 10 Natural habitats provide valuable environmental goods and services at each time period t.
11 Let denote by B(t) their per-unit value and assume it randomly ‡uctuates according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
where and are respectively the drift and the volatility parameters, and dz(t) is the increment of a Wiener process.
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At each t, two competitive and mutually exclusive destinations may be given to forested land: conservation or irreversible development. Once the plot is cleared, the landholder becomes a farmer using land as an input for agricultural production (or commercial forestry). 8 As in Bulte et al. (2002) A 0 may represent the best land which has been already converted to agriculture. 9 For the sake of generality we simply refer to landholders. In our model in fact, as quite common in a developing country scenario, the appropriability of values attached to land is not conditional on the existence of a legal entitlement. See Gregersen et al. (2010) .
1 0 None of our results relies on this assumption. In fact, provided that no single agent has signi…cant market power, we can obtain identical results by allowing each agent to own more than one unit of land. See e.g. Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier (2002) . 1 1 They may include biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, watershed control, provision of scenic beauty for recreational activities and ecotourism, timber and non-timber forest products. See e.g. Conrad (1997) , Conrad (2000) , Clarke and Reed (1989) , Reed (1993) , Bulte et al. (2002) . 1 2 The Brownian motion in (2) is a reasonable approximation for conservation bene…ts and we share this assumption with most of the existing literature. Conrad (1997, p. 98 ) considers a geometric Brownian motion for the amenity value as a plausible assumption to capture uncertainty over individual preferences for amenity. Bulte et al. (2002, p.152 ) point out that "parameter can be positive (e.g., re ‡ecting an increasingly important carbon sink function as atmospheric CO2 concentration rises), but it may also be negative (say, due to improvements in combinatorial chemistry that lead to a reduced need for primary genetic material)". However, this assumption neglects the direct feedback e¤ect that conversion decisions may have on the stochastic process illustrating the dynamic of conservation bene…ts. See Leroux et al. (2009) for a model where such e¤ect is accounted by letting conservation bene…ts follow a controlled di¤usion process with both drift and volatility depending on the conversion path. 1 3 In the following, "landholder" refers to an agent conserving land and "farmer" to an agent cultivating it.
The Government
ES usually have the nature of public good. To induce their provision we assume that at time period t = 0 the Government o¤ers a contract to be accepted on a voluntary basis by each farmer. A compensation equal to 1 B(t) with 1 2 [0; 1] is paid at each time period t if the entire plot is conserved. On the contrary, if the landholder aims to develop his/her parcel, a restriction is imposed in that a portion of the total surface, 0 1, must be conserved. 14 In this case, a payment equal to 2 B(t) with 2 2 [0; 1 ] 15 may be o¤ered to compensate the landholder. 16 In addition, besides the Government …xes an upper level A on total land conversion. These two limits may be …xed to account for critical ecological thresholds at which, if crossed, the ES provision may dramatically lower or vanish. 17 It is straightforward to see that depending on the magnitude of the existence of a ceiling may preclude land development for some landholders. To account for this outcome we denote by N = A 1 the number of potential farmers involved in the conversion process and assume N F (0).
Our framework is general enough to include di¤erent conservation targets such as old-growth forests or habitat surrounding wetlands, marshes, lagoons or by the marine coastline and meet several spatial requirements. For instance, the conservation target may be represented by an area divided into homogenous parcels running along a river or around a lake or a lagoon where, to maintain a signi…cant provision of ecosystem services, a portion of each parcel must be conserved (see …gure 1). As stressed by the literature in spatial ecology, the creation of bu¤er areas, by managing the proximity of human economic activities, is crucial since it guarantees the e¢ ciency of conservation measures in the targeted areas. 18 In this case the conservation program may be induced by implementing a payment contract schedule di¤erentiating for the state of land i.e. totally conserved vs. developed within the restriction enforced through environmental law. However, we are also able to consider the opposite case where the landholder may totally develop his/her plot but an upper limit is …xed on the total extent of land which can be cleared in the region. 
The Landholders
Developing the parcel is an irreversible action which has a sunk cost, (1 )c, including cost for clearing and settling land for agriculture. 20 Denoting by A(t) the total land developed at time t, the number of farmers must be equal to N (t) =
and since 1 is …xed, the conversion dynamic must mirror the variation in the number of farmers, i.e. dN (t) = dA(t) 1
. Therefore, assuming that the extent of each plot is small enough to exclude any potential price-making consideration, we may use either N (t) or A(t) when evaluating the individual decision process. 21 Competition on the market for agricultural products implies that at each time period t the optimal number of farmers (or the optimal total land developed) is determined by the entry zero pro…t condition. In addition, since the per-parcel value of services, B(t), makes all agents symmetric.
We assume a constant elasticity demand function for agricultural products P A (t) = A(t) with > 0 and > 0: The parameter illustrates di¤erent states of the demand while is the inverse of the demand elasticity. Now, let's solve for the conversion process taking 1 , 2 and as exogenously given parameters. Denoting by P A (t) the marginal return as land is cleared over time, the farmer instantaneous pro…t function is given by:
The discounted present value of the bene…ts accruing over an in…nite horizon is given by:
(A(t); B(t); A)dt 2 0 Bulte et al., (2002, p. 152) de…ne c as "the marginal land conversion cost ". It "may be negative if there is a positive one-time net bene…t from logging the site that exceeds the costs of preparing the harvested site for crop production ". We also assume, without loss of generality, that the conversion cost is proportional to the surface cleared. 2 1 To consider in…nitesimally small agents is a standard assumption in in…nite horizon models investigating dynamic industry equilibrium under competition. See for instance Jovanovic (1982) , Dixit (1989) , Hopenhayn (1992) , Lambson (1992) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chp. 8) , Bartolini (1993) , Caballero and Pindyck (1996) , Dosi and Moretto (1992) and Moretto (2008) . 2 2 Note that the expected value is taken accounting for A(t) increasing over time as land is cleared. See Harrison (1985, p. 44). where r is the constant risk-free interest rate, 23 (A(t); B(t); A)=(1 )P A (t) + ( 2 1 )B(t) and is the stochastic conversion time.
In (4) the …rst term represents the perpetuity paid by the Government if the parcel is conserved, while the second term represents the extra pro…t that each landholder may expect if she/he clears the land and becomes a farmer. The extra pro…t is given by the crop yield sold on the market plus the di¤erence in the payments received by the Government. As soon as the excess pro…t from land development equals the deforestation cost, the landholder may clear the parcel. This implies that the optimal conversion timing depends only on the second term in (4).
The Competitive Equilibrium
Denote by V (A(t); B(t); A) the value function of an in…nitely living farmer. 24 By (4), the optimal conversion time, , solves the following maximization problem:
where I [t= ] is an indicator function stating that at the time of conversion, due to market competition among farmers, the value attached to land conversion must equal the cost of land clearing. In the real option literature the problem we must solve is referred to as "optimal stopping" (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 ). The idea is that at any point in time the value of immediate investment (stopping) is compared with the expected value of waiting over the next dt (continuation), given the information available at that point in time (the stock of land developed, A, and the value of the stochastic variable B) and the knowledge of the two processes, i.e. dA and dB. If the initial size of the active farmers is A A 0 , we expect the converting process to work as follows: for a …xed number of farmers, pro…ts in (3) move stochastically driven only by B. As soon as the per-parcel value of ES reaches a critical level, say B (A), development (i.e. entry into the agricultural market) becomes feasible. This implies an increase, dA, in cultivated land and a drop in revenues from agriculture along the demand function P A (A). The value of services will then continue to move stochastically until the next entry occurs. Let V (A; B; A) be twice-di¤erentiable in B, and expand dV (A; B; A) using Ito's Lemma. Then, in the region of values where no conversion takes place, the solution to (5) must solve the following di¤erential equation:
This is an ordinary di¤erential equation since the number of farmers is constant. Using standard arguments the general solution is (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) :
where 1 < 1 < r= , 2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation Q( ) = 1 2 2 ( 1)+ r = 0 and Z 1 , Z 2 are two constants to be determined. 2 3 The introduction of risk aversion does not change the results since the analysis can be developed under a risk-neutral probability measure for B(t). See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details. 2 4 As we show in the appendix (A.2), the problem can be equivalently solved considering a landholder evaluating the option to develop. 2 5 In the following we will drop the time subscript for notational convenience. 2 6 In our setting the (competitive) equilibrium bounding the pro…t process for each farmer can be constructed as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in entry strategies. By the in…nite divisibility of F , the equilibrium can be determined by simply looking at the single landholder clearing policy which is de…ned ignoring the competitors' entry decisions (see Leahy, 1993) . Consider a short interval dt where no conversion takes place. Over this interval A is constant and the farmer holds an asset paying To determine the optimal conversion threshold, B (A), the landholder must consider bene…ts and costs attached to conversion. According to (7) , the pro…t accruing from the crop yield, (1 )
A r , is counterbalanced by the di¤erence in the payments, ( 2 1 ) B r , received for conservation. In addition, note that as landholders convert land and become farmers pro…t from agriculture decreases. This negative e¤ect on the value of converted land is accounted for in (7) by the second term (Z 2 (A) 0 for A A). In fact, since by assumption 1 2 implies 1 > 2 then only an expected reduction in B can induce conversion. 27 Since 1 > 0 then to keep V (A; B; A) …nite we must drop the …rst term by setting Z 1 = 0, i.e. lim B!1 V (A,B; A) = 0. Hence, (7) reduces to:
To determine Z 2 (A) and B (A) some suitable boundary conditions on (8) are required. First, development by increasing the number of competing farmers in the market keeps the value of being an active farmer below (1 )c. Second, marginal rents for an active farmer must be null at B (A). These considerations can be formalized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Provided that each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricultural goods for land to be converted, the following condition must hold
where the conversion rule is
Proof. See appendix A.1.
In Proposition 1, we denote byÂ the last parcel for which conversion makes economic sense (i.e. rÂ c = 0) and by A + the surface at which a conversion run starts (i.e. B (A + ) = B ( A)): Note that for conversion to be optimal, the dynamic zero pro…t condition in (9) must hold at the threshold, B (A). By rearranging (9) we obtain
This condition says that bene…ts from becoming a farmer must equal the opportunity cost of conversion, i.e. the cost of land clearing plus the payment perpetuity which is implicitly given up, as stated in equation (4), by converting. By Proposition 1 the whole conversion dynamics are characterized in terms of B. Since the agent's size is in…nitesimal, the trigger B (A) must be a decreasing function of A. In both …gure 2 and 3 conservation is optimal in the region above the curve. In fact, in this region, B is high enough to deter conversion and each landholder conserves up to the time where B driven by (2) drops to B (A). Then, as B crosses B (A) from above, a discrete mass of landholders will enter the agricultural market developing (part of ) their land. Since higher competition reduces pro…ts from agriculture, entries take place until conditions for conservation are restored (B > B (A)). Further, Proposition 1 also shows that even if the ES provided by a targeted ecosystem is not entirely compensated for, i.e. 1 1, the Government may still be able to induce landholders to conserve their plot. 28 Depending on A, we obtain two di¤erent scenarios (see …gure 2 and 3):
(1) ifÂ A, the conversion process stops atÂ. This in turn implies that the surface, A Â 0, is conserved forever at a total cost equal to 1 B r ( A Â ). A, when B hits the threshold B (A), the landholders start a run for conversion up to A. Unlike the previous case, here the limit imposed by the Government binds and restricts conversion on a surface, A Â > 0 where development would be pro…table from the landholder's viewpoint. The intuition behind this result is immediate if we take a backward perspective. When the limit imposed by the Government A is reached, then it must be Z 2 ( A) = 0 since no new entry may occur. Hence, condition (9) reduces to V ( A; B ( A); A)=(1 )
B ( A) r = (1 )c from which we obtain (10bis (b)) as optimal trigger. This implies that at A marginal rents induced by future reduction in B are not null, i.e. V B ( A; B; A) < 0, and they would be entirely captured by market incumbents. Since each single landholder realizes the bene…t from marginally anticipating his entry decision, then an entry run occurs to avoid the restriction imposed by the Government. However, by rushing, the rent attached to information on market pro…tability, collectable by waiting, vanishes. Therefore there will be a land extent (i.e. a number of farmers), A + < A, such that for A < A + no landholder …nds it convenient to rush since the marginal advantages from a future reduction in B are lower than the option value lost. 29 Note also that, as A + is given by B (A + ) = B ( A), the threshold in (10bis), triggering the run, results in the traditional NPV break-even rule (see Appendix A.1). 30 2 8 This result is in line with Ferraro (2001, p. 997) where the author states that conservation practitioners "may also …nd that they do not need to make payments for an entire targeted ecosystem to achieve their objectives. They need to include only "just enough" of the ecosystem to make it unlikely, given current economic conditions, infrastructure, and enforcement levels, that anyone would convert the remaining area to other uses". 2 9 This means the A + th is the last landholder for whom V B (A + ; B (A + ); A) = 0: 3 0 In Bartolini (1993) a similar result is obtained. Under linear adjustment costs and stochastic returns, investment cost is constant up to the investment limit where it becomes in…nite. As a reaction to this external e¤ect, recurrent runs may occur under competition as aggregate investment approaches the ceiling. See also Moretto (2008) . 
Comparative statics
As shown in table 1 the de…nition of the last plot,Â, which is worth converting, depends on parameters regulating the demand for agricultural goods, the interest rate and the land unit conversion cost. A higher illustrating a higher demand for agricultural products and/or a more rigid demand movesÂ forward since higher pro…ts support the conversion for a larger land surface. Similarly, as c ! 0, all the available land will be cultivated (Â ! A). With a higher r future returns from agriculture become relatively lower with respect to the cost of clearing land and land conversion is less attractive. In table 1, we provide some comparative statics illustrating the e¤ect that changes in the exogenous parameters have on the threshold level B (A). Changes in an exogenous parameter, whenever increasing (decreasing) conversion bene…ts with respect to conservation bene…ts, rede…ne, by moving upward (downward) the boundary B (A), the conversion and conservation regions. In this light, for instance, to a higher corresponds higher pro…ts from agriculture and thus a higher B (A) and a larger conversion region. The same e¤ect is also produced by a relatively more inelastic demand. On the contrary, the opposite occurs as c increases since a higher conversion cost decreases net conversion bene…ts. With an increase in the interest rate, exercise of the option to convert should be anticipated but this e¤ect is too weak to prevail over the e¤ect that a higher r has on the opportunity cost of conversion. Studying the e¤ect of volatility, , and of growth parameter, , the sign of the derivatives is in line with the standard insight in the real options literature. An increase in the growth rate and volatility of B determines postponed exercise of the option to convert. This can be explained by the need to reduce the regret of taking an irreversible decision under uncertainty. Since the cost of this decision is growing at a faster rate and there is uncertainty about its magnitude, waiting to collect information about future prospects is a sensible strategy.
In …gure 4 and 5 we illustrate the impact on the conversion threshold of a change in and when A <Â, respectively. 31 The comparative statics above are con…rmed. As increases the land development run is postponed. The interpretation is straightforward. In fact, a higher expected growth in the value of ES, by raising the opportunity cost of conversion, makes land development less attractive. This in turn reduces the regret for being halted by the ceiling A on land development imposed by the government. On the contrary, as soars the run is anticipated. This e¤ect may seem counterintuitive since a higher lowers the conversion barrier. However, by the convexity of B (A), as the land is developed a decrease of the level of B induces conversion on larger surfaces. Hence, since a higher volatility of B increases the probability of reaching the conversion barrier then landowners start running earlier in that it becomes more likely that the ceiling A may be binding. Let's consider now the conservation policy parameters. As expected, an increase in 1 pushes the barrier downward since it makes it more pro…table to conserve the plot and keep open the option to convert. In line with this result, the barrier responds in the opposite way to an increase in 2 which implicitly provides an incentive to conversion. Changes in have a monotonic e¤ect. A higher de…nes a stricter requirement on development that may push the barrier downward for two reasons. First, a lower return from agriculture since less land is cultivated which is, however, balanced by a lower cost for clearing land, and second, since 1 > 2 then a higher payment on the marginal unit which the farmer is required to set aside is guaranteed if the plot is totally conserved. By using the second consideration the optimal conversion rule must be clearly independent on when 1 = 2 .
These considerations mostly hold for both (10) and (10 bis). Clearly, over the interval A + < A A since the option multiple, 2 2 1 , drops out, the barrier B (A) is not a¤ected by . The derivative with respect to the bene…t drift maintains the sign in table 1 while the comparative statics on r reveals:
Finally, since by (10bis) the same level of B triggers the entry of a positive mass of landholders, i.e. B (A + ) = B ( A), it is worth highlighting that the surface at which the conversion rush starts (A + ) is independent of the de…nition of 1 , 2 and . The Government policy may either speed up or slow down the conversion dynamic but it cannot alter A + which depends only on the choice of A with respect toÂ. Note that @A + =@ A > 0 which reasonably means that as A !Â the run would be triggered only by a relatively lower level for B. In other words, since in expected terms a higher A implies a less strict threat of being regulated, then landholders are not willing to give up information rents collectable by waiting. Not surprisingly, @A + =@Â < 0. A lower A implies a faster drop in the pro…t from agriculture as A increases and then a lower incentive for the conversion run.
First vs second-best policies
A natural benchmark for our analysis is represented by the socially optimal conversion policy. Since a social planner does not need to impose the individual restriction ; its optimal strategy can be obtained from (10) by simply setting 1 = 1 and = 0 (i.e.
= 1). That is
Note that forÂ A this is the …rst-best conversion strategy in Bulte et al. (2002) . In our model, it is immediate to show that several combinations of the second-best tools 1 ; 2 and result in = 1 and lead to the …rst-best conversion policy. In particular, explicating such combinations in terms of 2 , the …rst-best outcome correspond to the relationship 2 = 1 1 1 . However, we observe that this result would not hold whenÂ > A. In this case, even if the triple ( 1 ; 2 ; ) is such that = 1 the …rst and second-best conversion policies would overlap only up to A + . In fact, once reached the level A + the second-best land clearing process, due to the start of a conversion run, accelerates and rapidly exhausts the available forest stock.
Out of the …rst-best optimal conversion path ( 6 = 1) the two following scenarios may arise (see …gures 6 and 7):
In …gure 6 the area below the full line is the set of feasible payment rates (0 2 1 ) while the dotted line represents the combination of policy parameters leading to a …rst-best conversion policy for any given
The feasible area is split in two regions where depending on the triple ( 1 ; 2 ; ), the second-best conversion process may be in expected terms faster ( > 1: case (a)) or slower ( < 1: case (b)) than the …rst-best one. It is immediate to note that Corollary 1 a) For 1 1 the second-best conversion process can never be slower than in …rst-best. b) As ! 0 then the region where B F B > B (A) shrinks no matters the level of 2 .
The …rst result (a) holds even when the Government, to deter development, expropriates the portion without any compensation ( 2 = 0). Finally, result (b) suggests the use of higher 1 or lower 2 to contrast the e¤ect of a less strict set-aside requirement, . The opposite considerations can be formulated for ! 1. 
Voluntary participation or contract enforceability?
Once the optimal conversion rules have been determined, we focus in this section on the issue of voluntary participation which is a crucial aspect in a PES scheme (Wunder, 2005) . In this respect, two elements must be considered. First, the dynamic of the whole conversion process involving all the landholders who enrolled under the conservation program. Second, the restrictions on land development that the Government may wish to impose in the form of takings on landholders not entering the conservation program. 33 A conservation contract may be accepted on a voluntary basis only if each landholder is better-o¤ signing it than not. As it can be easily seen, the acceptance will crucially depend on the expectation concerning the ability of the Government to impose a > 0 to landholder not enrolling under the PES scheme. Let's formalize this consideration assuming that no compensation is paid if a taking occurs. Since by Proposition 1 the conversion is optimal at B (A) then an in…nitely living landholder signs the contract if and only if:
where 2 [0; 1] is the probability of regulation, i.e. the restriction holds also for landholders not signing the contract. In (12) the LHS describes the position of a landholder within the program while on the RHS we have the expected present value for a landholder not accepting the contract and developing land at time t. Note that in the last case the conversion option is exercised as soon as the expected cost of conversion, Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 1.
Segerson and Miceli (1998) show that if the probability of future regulation is positive then a voluntary agreement can always be reached. By Proposition 2 we show that this result does not hold in our frame. In fact, uncertainty about future regulation does not allow capturing of all the agents who can be potentially regulated. A similar result is obtained by Langpap and Wu (2004) in a regulator-landowner two-period model for conservation decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility. In their paper, since contract pay-o¤s are uncertain and signing is an irreversible decision, under certain conditions a landholder may not accept it to stay ‡exible. Unlike them, we show that under the same threat of regulation a contract can be voluntarily signed by some landholders and not by others. Not surprisingly, imposing by contract constraints on land development reduces ‡exibility and discourages voluntary participation. Clearly, due to decreasing pro…t from agriculture, this holds for some landholders but not for all since entering the conservation program becomes more attractive as land is progressively cleared.
Summing up, the voluntary participation crucially depends on the likelihood of takings but also on the magnitude of the compensation payment which a court may impose. In fact, needless to say, if takings can be compensated, then the requirement for contract acceptance becomes more stringent and it is more di¢ cult to sustain agreements on a voluntary basis. 34 
The long-run average rate of forest conversion
We have shown above that even if not entirely compensated ( 1 1) landholders may still conserve their plot in its pristine state. However, their "inertia" addresses only "statically" the conservation/development dilemma since they will develop their plots as soon as it will become pro…table. Hence, in this section we focus on the temporal implications of the optimal conversion policy, i.e. how long it takes to clear the target surface A, and on the impact of increasing uncertainty about future environmental bene…ts, B, and conversion cost, c, on conversion speed. As main instrument for this analysis, in the following lines we derive a long-run average growth rate of forest conversion (see A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix).
Let's consider the case where b A A. This represents the more interesting case since the analysis below remains valid also for the opposite case over the range A < A + . Note in fact that for A A + the long-run rate of reforestation must obviously tend to in…nity due to the conversion run. Rearranging relations (10) yields:
where indicates a regulated process in the sense of Harrison (1985, chp. 2) with^ = 2 2 1 (1 ) c as upper re ‡ecting barrier.
The …rst term on the RHS of (14) represents the expected discounted pro…t from the cultivation of land conditional on the number of farmers remaining constant. The multiple 2 2 1 < 1 accounts for the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility. The second term is the expected discounted ‡ow of payments implicitly given up by developing land net of the payments for conservation paid for setting aside as required by the Government. When a reduction of B drives upward toward^ then some landholders may …nd pro…table land conversion. New entries in the market, however, determine a drop along P A (A) which by balancing for the e¤ect of B prevents from rising above^ . It follows that since entry is instantaneous then the rate of deforestation is in…nite at^ . 35 Conversely, if <^ the level of B is high enough to support conservation, no entries occur and consequently the deforestation rate is null. Hence, the re ‡ecting barrier^ does not generate a …nite rate of deforestation over time but long periods of inaction followed by short periods of rapid bursts of land conversion. However, if a steady state distribution for exists within the range ( 1;^ ) then it would be always possible to obtain the corresponding marginal distribution for A. This in turn would allow us to determine the long-run average growth rate of forest conversion. Note that since A and B enter additively in (14) the derivation of a steady-state distribution for A is not straightforward. After some tedious algebra, in the appendix we show that:
Proposition 3 For any initial condition (B;Ã) such that (B;Ã) =^ then relations (10) and (10bis) can be approximated as follows:
Then, denoting by A) the measure of the expected long-run growth rate of forest conversion it can be approximated by:
where
Proof. See Appendix A.4. Thus, ifB is the current value of ES and, by (10),Ã is the corresponding current optimal surface of converted land, the expression in (15b) is the best guess for the average rate at which the forested surface, A Ã , is cleared. Remember that ifÃ >Â then the deforestation rate is null since r A < c forÂ < A A.
It is straightforward to verify that the rate in (15b) is increasing in the volatility of future payments for < 1 2
2 . Although at a …rst glance this result may seem counterintuitive, it follows from the distribution of the log-normal process with an upper re ‡ecting barrier at^ . A higher volatility has two distinct e¤ects. First, it pushes the barrier^ downward; second, by increasing the positive skewness of the distribution of , it raises the probability of the barrier being reached. 36 Both e¤ects induce a higher rate of deforestation in both the short-run and long-run. On the contrary for 1 2 2 the process drives away from^ and the rate falls to zero.
Furthermore, the rate in (15b) is decreasing in c: The conversion cost has two opposite e¤ects on the expected land clearing speed. The …rst prevailing e¤ect is immediate and due to the direct braking impact of a more costly decision. The second is more subtle. Since future land clearing will be triggered by a decreasing B then, by delaying conversion, to a higher c corresponds a lower conversion opportunity cost, ( 1 2 )B, in the future. Finally, since as c ! 0 then (Ã A ) ! 0; by (15b) it is also immediate to note that: 37 
Corollary 2
When c = 0 the impact of the Government conservation policies on the long-run deforestation rate vanishes. The long-run deforestation rate depends only on the dynamic of B (i.e. ;
2 ); and the economic pro…tability of land development (i.e. ):
This result makes sense. Since land development comes at no cost (i.e. the conversion opportunity cost results extremely low), and it is, depending on the level of B, pro…table over a vast land surface the Government policies are completely neutralized in the long-run.
The Costa Rica case study
In this section we provide a numerical exercise to illustrate our …ndings. We calibrate the model to …t the characteristics of the Area de Conservación Tortuguero (ACTo).
38 This is a territorial unit which covers about 355375 hectares by including the cantones of Guacimo and Pococi, a portion of the canton of Sarapiqui and the province of Limon. In administrative terms, the ACTo is the regional o¢ ce of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), a public body in charge for the sustainable exploitation of forest resources and the conservation of national natural forests. Currently, as reported by Calvo (2008, p. 11) , 148000 hectares of the total surface are still forested 39 while in the remainder, i.e. 207375 hectares, economic activities, such as agriculture, ranching and forestry, have been undertaken.
In our calculations, we set the following values for the parameters:
1. The extent of the original forested area, F , is 355375 hectares. The currently converted portion is equal to A 0 = 207375 hectares. 40 We assume that the government allows the development of the 50% of the remaining land, i.e. 74000 hectares. This implies that forest conversion should be halted at A = 281375.
2. The annual value of ES,B, is equal to $75=ha when we only account for the forest production function, i.e. sustainable exploitation of timber and non-timber forest products and sustainable ecotourism. Otherwise, to include regulatory and habitat functions, we set it equal to $200=ha. 41 To study the impact of its trend and volatility on forest conversion dynamics, we let take values 0, 0:025, and 0:05 and let vary within the interval [0; 0:35].
3. The ACTo belongs to the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica targeted by Bulte et al. (2002) . Consistently, in order to draw our demand for agricultural products, we borrow from their study the estimated parameters, = $6990062 (in 1998 US$) and = 0:887.
4.
A 7% risk free interest rate is assumed (r = 0:07). Finally, to capture the e¤ect of conversion costs on deforestation and land conversion runs we will consider di¤erent levels of costly deforestation, c = [0; 500; 1500].
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In the following, we …rst present an analysis of …rst-best conversion dynamics. Then, once discussed the e¤ect of relevant parameters, we illustrate the implications of second-best policies on optimal forest stocks and deforestation rates under di¤erent scenarios. In the tables below we provide the optimal forest stock which should be held, A Ã , and the average deforestation rate at which such stock should be optimally exhausted in the long-run. Note that in our calculations the deforestation rate may be null in two cases. First, trivially, when the optimal forest stock, A Ã ; is completely exhausted and second, when the expected ‡uctuation of B induces inertia, i.e.
2
2 . We will distinguish between them using 0 for the former and a dash for the latter.
Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under …rst-best policy
Suppose for the moment that the social planner may count on the total pristine forested surface of 355375 hectares and that the ceiling on forest conversion is A = 281375. As shown above, the …rst-best optimal conversion policy can be easily obtained by setting 1 = 1 and = 0 ( = 1). By plugging the assumed level forB in equation (10) we determine the corresponding optimal converted land surface,Ã = A(B), and by subtracting it from A, the optimal forest stock. The long-run rate at which such stock should be exploited is instead determined by pluggingÃ into (15b). Results in tables 2 and 3 con…rms the comparative statics previously presented. As expected, higher conversion costs induce larger optimal forest stocks and lower long-run average deforestation rates. We observe the same e¤ect for higher level ofB: This is not surprising since the opportunity cost of conversion increases withB. Table 2 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under …rst-best with c = 0
We observe that the optimal forest stock is increasing in both expected trend, , and volatility, ; of the level of payments for ES. The insight behind this result is standard in the real option literature. Since with higher and/or development is induced by lower levels of B then conversion is postponed and the optimal converted surface corresponding to a givenB must be lower. We note that for high level of and , the forest stock should be almost intact. Long-run average rate of deforestation are null for 1 2 2 . For this range of values, the expected trend, , is in fact strong enough to take the level of B far from the conversion barrier. For < 1 2 2 the deforestation rate is decreasing in and increasing in . As discussed above this depends on the di¤erent sign of the impact that changes in these parameters have on the regulated process and the upper re ‡ecting barrier^ . Table 3 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under …rst-best with c = 500
By comparing the picture drawn by our tables and the available data, it is immediate to realize that the level of currently conserved land is in the most part of cases well below the optimal levels. We note that only forB = 75 and with low levels of and the current forest stock is in line or above the optimal levels. This implies that, on average, the past deforestation rates have been considerably higher than the optimal ones.
Thus, on the basis of these considerations, the crucial question becomes: given that 207375 hectares have been developed then how long it takes to clear the targeted surface A = 281375? We answer this question by taking a di¤erent perspective. In the previous section given a certainB we computed the optimal forest stock and the associated deforestation rate. Here, on the contrary, we establish a common initial converted land surface, A 0 = 207375, and calculate the long-run average deforestation rate and the relative expected time of total conversion for di¤erent levels of ; and c.
In table 4 we observe that the expected time required for exhausting the forest stock decreases with uncertainty. This result can be easily explained addressing the reader to the relationship between average deforestation rate and volatility previously discussed. This e¤ect is partially balanced by higher conversion cost and higher expected growth in the payments for ES. In terms of delayed conversion, the e¤ect of is more remarkable. In fact, note that with low uncertainty ( 2 [0; 0:1]) it is possible to deter conversion, even if costless (c = 0), by simply guaranteeing a higher expected growth in the payments (see …gure 8).
43 Table 4 : Long-run deforestation rates and timing with c = 0 and c = 500 
Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under secondbest policy
In this section, we focus on the implications of a second-best approach to conservation policies. Our analysis will consider three main scenarios (see table 5 ). In the …rst one, we will highlight the impact on conservation of a reduction in the compensation for ES provision (scenario 1) while in scenarios 2 and 3 we will study the role of compensation for a restriction on land development. 44 We will not discuss the e¤ect of parameters e B; ; and c since they are perfectly in line with the analysis under …rst-best. We will rather concentrate on the peculiar characteristics of second-best conservation policies. Table 6 illustrates the dramatic impact of conversion run occurring when the ceiling on forest conservation is binding ( A <Â).
45 By comparing scenarios 1 and 3 with the …rst-best outcome the forest stock is sensibly lower. The e¤ect is particularly drastic for = 0 where the forest stock would be totally exhausted. On the contrary, under scenario 2 the second-best policy is more conservative than the …rst-best one. This is not surprising since in this case the policy imposes no compensation on the portion set aside when developing ( 2 = 0). Note that such a policy is substantially similar to an uncompensated taking even if, di¤erently from a taking, its provisions are accepted on a voluntary basis by signing the initial conservation contract. Interestingly, under scenario 3 the forest stock is larger than under scenario 1. In this case, even if there is a compensation for the portion set aside the restriction on land development deters conversion. We observe 4 4 Numerical results under other scenarios are available upon request. 4 5 Tables illustrating scenarios with land conversion run for e B = 200 and without land conversion run ( A Â ) are available in the appendix. that for > 0 deforestation would proceed at a relatively low speed under each scenario, at least up to the level A + where due to the conversion run the remaining forest stock is instantaneously exhausted. Table 6 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with c = 500
Let conclude by highlighting through …gures 9 and 10 the role played by the conversion cost, c. Under each policy scenario we determine (for e B = 75; = 0:025 and 2 [0; 0:35]); the …rst-best surface of land developed,Ã, and the surface, A + , triggering a conversion run. Then we plot the di¤erenceÃ A + . By comparing …gure 9 and 10, the lower is c the more remarkable is the impact of the land conversion run. In other words, under both scenarios 1 and 3,Ã > A + over the entire range of which means that in those scenarios a conversion run, started well before having reachedÃ, would have completely exhausted the forest stock by clearing land up to the ceiling A: The impact of lower conversion costs should then be taken seriously into account since, as shown, for c ! 0 landowners would rush even for expected payments growing at a positive rate. 
Conclusions
In this paper we contribute to the vast literature on optimal land allocation under uncertainty and irreversible development. We extend previous work in three respects. First, departing from the standard central planner perspective we investigate the role that competing farming may have on conversion dynamics. Under competition, decreasing pro…ts from agriculture may discourage conversion in particular if society is willing to reward habitat conservation as land use. Second, in this decentralized framework, we look at the conservation e¤ort that Government land policy, through a combination of voluntary and command approaches, may stimulate. In this regard, an interesting result is represented by the considerable amount of conservation that the Government can induce by partially compensating agents for the ES provided. By comparing …rst-best and second-best conversion policies, we study the impact that di¤erent combinations of policy parameters may have on the expected conversion speed. Then, we show how the conservation payment schedule must be designed to limit the impact of set-aside requirements.
In addition, we show that the existence of a ceiling for the stock of developable land may produce perverse e¤ects on conversion dynamics by activating a run which instantaneously exhausts the stock. Third, we believe that time matters when dynamic land allocation is analysed. Hence, we suggest the use of the optimal long-run average expected rate of conversion to assess the temporal performance of conservation policy and we show its utility by running several numerical simulations based on realistic policy scenarios.
A Appendix

A.1 Equilibrium
The value function of a farmer is given by:
Since each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricultural goods at B (A) she/he must be indi¤erent between conserving and converting. That is:
In addition, the following conditions must hold (see e.g. Proposition 1 in Bartolini (1993) and Grenadier (2002, p. 699)):
and
Finally, considering the limit on conversion, A; imposed by the Government it follows that: 
Since Z 2 A = 0 and 
Finally, by the continuity of B (A) follows that B (A + ) = B ( A). Substituting:
The conversion policy is summarized by (A.1.8) and (A.1.9). The conversion policy should be smooth until the surface A + < A has been converted. At A + landholders rush and a run takes place to convert the residual land before the limit imposed by the Government is met. By (A.1.9), B (A) is decreasing with respect to A. This makes sense since further land conversion reduces the pro…t from agriculture and a landholder would convert land only if she/he expects a future reduction in B.
We must investigate two di¤erent scenarios, i.e.Â A andÂ > A. From (A.1.10) it follows that:
Studying (A.1.10 bis) we can state that since -ifÂ > A then it must be A + < A. In this case, land is converted smoothly up to A + where landholders start a run to convert land up to A.
A.2 Value of the option to convert
In this appendix we show that, by competition, the value of the opportunity to develop the plot by the single farmer is null at the conversion threshold. The value of the option to convert, F (A,B; A), is the solution of the following di¤erential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 , ch. 8):
where B C (A) is the optimal threshold for conversion. Note that this is an ordinary di¤erential equation, the general solution of which can be written as:
where 1 < 1 < r= , 2 < 0 are the positive and the negative root of the characteristic equation ( ) = 1 2 2 ( 1) + r = 0, and C 1 , C 2 are two constants to be determined. Since 1 2 then as B increases, the value of the option to convert should vanish (lim B!1 F (A; B; A) = 0). This implies that C 1 = 0. Now, let's determine the optimal conversion threshold B C (A) and the constant C 1 (A). We attach to the di¤erential equation above the following value matching and the smooth pasting conditions: 
As expected the value of the option to convert is null at B C (A) = B (A).
A.3 Long-run distributions
Let h be a linear Brownian motion with parameters and that evolves according to dh = dt + dw. A.4 Long-run average growth rate of deforestation
Taking the logarithm of (14) we get: Since by (A.3.3) E(h) is independent on t, di¤erentiating with respect to t, we obtain the expected long-run rate of deforestation: 
That is, as soars V ar( ) increases and so does the probability of hitting^ which in turn implies an increase in the long run average deforestation rate.
29
A.6 Additional tables
With land conversion run Table 7 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with e B = 200 and c = 500
No Rush Table 8 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with e B = 75 and c = 1500
Without land conversion run Table 9 : Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with e B = 200 and c = 1500
